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“The status of workers’ rights in a country is a bell-weather for the status of human rights in general.”
1
 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of international attention on the protection of workers’ rights. The 
growing interest is explained by an increased understanding among states and international organizations that 
workers rights are also within the vortex of human rights and deserve protection. This paper considers the extent 
to which Nigerian workers’ enjoy human rights at work.  The paper draws on the International Labour Standards 
established by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to measure the protection of workers’ rights. After 
briefly the reviewing the sources of Nigeria’s obligations to respect workers’ rights, the paper focuses on three 
key areas, namely membership of trade unions,  the promotion of free and voluntary collective bargaining and 
the right to take industrial action. The paper argues that Nigeria lags far behind internationally accepted 
standards as there are significant gaps between rhetoric, which stresses the importance of workers’ rights, and 
practice, which does little to realize it. Consequently, proposals toward reform designed to ensure greater 
protection for Nigerian workers and to bring Nigerian law and practice in line with minimum international 
standards are put forward and discussed. 
Keywords: Human Rights, Workers Rights, International Standards, Violations, Nigeria. 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
“Man is born free; and yet everywhere he is in chains.”
2
  
One of the issues of overriding concern of current international human rights law is the gap between the formal 
recognition and the re4alisation of human rights, the disparity between the promise to “give effect” to treaty 
provision and the effective implementation of these promises. 
The aim of this paper is to examine key aspects of workers rights by reference to Nigeria’s 
international obligations, especially under the ILO Conventions and the principles of freedom of association and 
to consider the extent to which Nigerian law might be said to be compatible with Nigeria’s obligations in 
international law. The discussion centers on three key areas, namely membership of trade unions, collective 
bargaining and the right to strike. The paper finds that Nigerian law remains largely inconsistent with Nigeria’s 
obligations under international law and does perpetuate and/or exacerbate a number of pre-existing areas of non-
compliance. 
Overall, this paper argues that to a significant degree Nigerian labour law still unduly restricts workers 
rights and that radical amendments are needed to enhance workers’ rights in Nigeria. Before going into 
substantive issues, however, it may be helpful briefly note the sources of Nigeria’s obligations to respect 
workers’ rights. 
 
2. Nigeria’s Obligations under International Human Rights Law 
Nigeria is a member of the international community
3
 and she is also a party to several international treaties that 
impose an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights. These treaties include the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (the “CEDAW”),
4
 the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (the “CRC”),
5  
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (the “ICERD”),
6
 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
                                                           
1 Virginia A. Leary, “The Paradox of Workers Rights as Human Rights”, in L.A. Compa and S.F. Diamond (eds), Human  
Rights, Labour Rights, and International Trade (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1996), p.2. 
2   Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, London, Penguin Classics (1762), p.1.  
3Nigeria joined the United Nations Organisation (UNO) on 7 October 1960, a week after she attained independence. Nigeria 
is also a member of a dozen or more inter-governmental organisations of a specialised nature related to the UNO, such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organization, etc. 
4 Ratified July 13, 1985. 
5 Ratified April 19, 1991 
6 Ratified January 4, 1969. 
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Treatment or Punishment (the “CAT”)
1
,
 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),
2
 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”).
3
 Nigeria is also a 
member of the ILO
4
 and has ratified both the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 
98).
5
  These treaties impose on Nigeria the obligation to deter and prevent violations of those rights, and to 
investigate, prosecute, and remedy their abuses.
6
 
The duty to investigate and punish also derives from the right to a legal remedy that these treaties 
extend to victims of human rights violations. Under international law, governments have an obligation to provide 
victims of human rights abuses with an effective remedy—including justice, truth, and adequate reparations—
after they suffer a violation. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for 
example, governments have an obligation “to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy.”
7
 The ICCPR imposes on states the duty to ensure that 
any person shall have their right to an effective remedy “determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.”
8
 
At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“the African Charter”) states 
that every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person and as such no one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one 
may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.
9
 Furthermore, every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, 
including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by 
an impartial court or tribunal.
10
 
There are also specific obligations on states to prevent and punish torture and disappearances. Thus the 
African Charter provides that “every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being and to the recognition of his legal status, and that all forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited.”
11
 
It is significant to note that the African Charter has not only been ratified by Nigeria but has also been 
                                                           
1 Ratified July 28, 2001. 
2 Ratified October 29, 1993. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See ILO: Alphabetical List of ILO member Countries, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited 4 March 2015). The ILO was founded in 1919 at 
the Paris Peace Conference to abolish “injustice, hardship and privation” suffered by workers and to guarantee fair and 
humane conditions of labour. See ILO Constitution, Preamble and Annex, at 
http//www.ilo.org/public/English/about/iloconst.htm (last visited 4 October 2007).  
5 Both Conventions were ratified on 17 October 1960. See ILO, List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, at 
http://webfusion/ilo/org/public/db/standards/normes/applappl-byCtry.cfm/lang=EN&CTYCHOICE=2020 (last visited 2 
March 2015). See also: Official Bulletin of the ILO, vol.XLIII (No.7) of 1960, p.524. 
6 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of international 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, March 21, 2006, adopted by the 60th session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/60/147, paras. 11 (c) and 24.  Para. 11: "Remedies for gross violations of 
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law include the victim's right to the 
following as provided for under international law: (c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation 
mechanisms."  Para. 24: "States should develop means of informing the general public and, in particular, victims of gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law of the rights and 
remedies addressed by these Basic Principles and Guidelines and of all available legal, medical, psychological, social, 
administrative and all other services to which victims may have a right of access." 
7 ICCPR, art. 2(3)(a). 
8 ICCPR, art. 2 (3)(b).  See also Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of international Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, March 21, 
2006, adopted by the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/60/147, principle II.3.(d). "The obligation 
to respect, ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided 
for under the respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to: (d) Provide effective remedies to victims, including 
reparation, as described below." 
9 Article 6 of the African Charter. 
10 Article 7, Ibid. 
11 Article 5, Ibid. 
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incorporated into Nigerian municipal law. The Charter was ratified by Nigeria on 19 January 1981,
1
 and was 
incorporated into Nigerian domestic law on 17 March 1983 as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983
2
 (“the African Charter Act”). The preamble to the African 
Charter Act proclaims that it is “necessary and expedient to make legislative provisions for the enforcement in 
Nigeria of the African Charter by way of an Act of the National Assembly.”
3
 The African Charter Act has not 
been repealed and is deemed to be an existing law enacted by the National Assembly, the Federal legislative 
organ of Nigeria.
4
 The domesticating provision of the African Charter Act states as follows: 
“As from the commencement of this Act, the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
which are set out in the Schedule to this Act shall, subject as thereunder provided have force of law in Nigeria 
and shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in Nigeria.”
5
  
This provision speaks for itself; it demonstrates Nigeria’s commitment to be bound by the letter and 
spirit of the African Charter. Perhaps more importantly, it also means that the African Charter has the status of 
domestic law in Nigeria and can actually be invoked before a court of law in Nigeria against any breach of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the African Charter. In Communication 115/96 SERAC v. Nigeria,
6
 for 
example, the African Commission held Nigeria to be in breach of its regional-international obligations under the 
provisions of the African Charter relating to right to satisfactory environment
7
 stating that, since Nigeria has 
incorporated the African Charter into her domestic law, all rights contained therein can be invoked in Nigerian 
courts including those violations alleged by the complainants.
8
  
Nigeria is therefore under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the rights guaranteed both under 
these international legal instruments and the African Charter in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, which states that, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith”.
9
 Moreover, a party may not invoke the provisions of internal law as a justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.
10
  We shall now proceed to examine the three key areas of workers rights in Nigeria. 
 
3. THE RIGHT TO MEMBERSHIP OF TRADE UNIONS 
A major reform introduced by the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005 is the democratisation of trade union 
membership. Prior the reform, trade union membership was virtually compulsory. Workers who worked in 
particular establishments were more or less conscripted to join the available unions in those establishments. 
Section 2 of the Act provides that, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade 
union by employee is voluntary and no employee shall be forced join any trade union or be victirnised for 
refusing to join as member.”
11
 
In a true liberal democracy, workers should have the freedom to decide whether they intend to join a 
trade union or not. This is because freedom of association also means that a worker can choose not to join or 
belong to a trade union organisation. It could be argued that the new amendment has only brought the Act to 
conform with the Constitution which already guarantees the right to voluntary membership of trade unions. 
However, the new law is salutary if only to remove any possible doubts since the court had held the former law 
which placed restrictions on trade union membership to be a law that is reasonably justified in a democratic 
                                                           
1See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 8I.L.M.679, which incorporates the time-honoured 
principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda bona fide into the Charter. 
2 See Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
3 See the Second Preambular paragraph to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act 1983. 
4 Section 315 (1) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides that: “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, an 
existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of 
this Constitution and shall be deemed to be – (a) an Act of the National Assembly to the extent that it is a law with respect to 
any matter on which the National Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws.” 
5  See Section 1. 
6Decided at the 30th Ordinary Session, Banjul, The Gambia, 13-27 Oct. 2001. 
7 See Articles 24 and 16. 
8Garba v. Attorney-General of Lagos State Suit No. ID559M/90 (unreported). See also Oshivire v. British Caledonian 
Airways Ltd (1990) 7 NWLR (Part 163) 507, 519-520; Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Part 660) 228 (SC); Ogugua v. 
The State (1994) 9 N.W.L.R. (Part 366)1, 26-27. 
9 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force on 27 January, 1980 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf> (15 January 2009).  
10 Ibid, Article 27. 
11  Section 2  Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005. 
See generally, W. Gould, “Solidarity Forever – Or Hardly Ever; Union Discipline, Taft-Hartley, and the Right of Union 
Members to Resign,” 66 Cornell Law Review (1980), pp.74-98. 
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society.
1
 More importantly, the new reform has also removed the restriction on freedom of choice arising from 
the stipulation in the Trade Unions Act
2
 that no trade union could be registered to represent employees where a 
trade union already existed. 
The new reform is certainly an improvement. However, it is not adequate because it fails to address the 
issue of restrictions on the number of persons required to form a union. Where the minimum number of persons 
required for the registration of a functional trade union is pegged too high, workers’ freedom of association will 
be impaired. In this regard, the ILO seems to support a minimum of twenty workers for the formation of a trade 
union.
3
 Whereas 50 members are required to form a trade union of workers, only two persons are required to 
form a trade union of employers.
4
 The law is obviously discriminatory in the treatment of the two parties to the 
industrial relationship, i.e. employers and workers. This requirement would appear to unduly restrain workers, 
and is in conflict with ILO Convention No. 87.
5
 The failure to relax the membership requirement may not be 
unconnected with the argument put forward by the Tripartite Committee on the Reform of Nigerian labour law 
that, for Nigeria, compliance with the ILO requirements on minimum membership is not viable.
6
 The argument 
is that the low threshold and the formal requirements for registration would lead to the proliferation of trade 
unions and undermine the solidarity of trade unions and employers’ associations in Nigeria. It would permit, if 
not encourage, the formation of trade unions and employers’ associations on ethnic, religious, regional and 
factional lines, which could feed into the regional and factional rivalries that characterise Nigerian politics.
7
 
However, the argument to sustain the high threshold for membership of trade unions in Nigeria does not appear 
to be a justifiable reason to deviate from the requirements of international labour standards. We must not always 
allow ethnic and religious sentiments to dissuade us from what is proper and necessary in a democratic society. 
If Nigeria is to make progress as a democratic nation it must be prepared to adopt international standards and 
allow freedom of association to survive. Ethnic and religious differences exist in many countries, yet elsewhere 
that has not been an excuse for not comply with International standards. For example, in Ghana - which is close 
to Nigeria in more ways than one - a minimum of two persons ate required to form a trade union.
8
 The ILO has 
in fact held that “the establishment of a trade union may be considerably hindered, or even tendered impossible, 
where legislation fixes... too high a figure, as is the case, for example where legislation requires...at least 50 
founder members.”
9
 Besides, if the competent authority has the discretionary power to refuse registration of a 
trade union on account of the 50-member requirement, this can in practice amount to a system of previous 
authorisation, contrary to the principles of Convention No.87. Article 2 of Convention 87 provides that workers, 
“without distinction whatsoever shall ha the right to establish, and subject only to the rules of the organisation 
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorization.” 
Furthermore, the ILO Committee on  Freedom of Association believes that while it is generally to the 
advantage of workers and employers to avoid the proliferation of competing organisations, a monopoly situation 
imposed by law is at variance with the principle of free choice of workers’ and employers’ organisations.
10
 As 
the Committee explains: 
“While fully appreciating the desire of any government to promote a strong 
trade union movement by avoiding the defects resulting from an undue 
multiplicity of small and competing trade unions, whose independence may 
be endangered by their weakness, the Committee has drawn attention to the 
fact that it is more desirable in such cases for a government to seek to 
encourage trade unions In join together voluntarily to form a strong and 
united organization than to impose upon them by legislation a compulsory 
                                                           
1 See Osawe v Registrar of Trade Unions (1985) 1 NWLR (pt.775). The point was also emphasized that the amendment was 
necessary  because the principal Act is undemocratic, having been enacted under the military regime, See President 
Obasanjo’s speech, note 7 above 
2 See Section, 4(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act 2004. 
3 See J. Erstling, The Right to Organise, Geneva, International Labour Office (1977), p.3. 
4 Section 3(1) (a)(b) of the Trade Unions Act 1990. 
5 Convention No.87 guarantees Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. See J. Erstling. The Right to 
Organise, note 15 above, p.3. 
6   See: Tripartile Committee on the Reform of Nigerian Labour Law: Collective Labour Relations Conceptual Draft 
http://www/necang.org/downloads/draftcollective.pdf#search=22collective20relations20act20nigeria (last accessed 2 March 
2015). 
7  Ibid  
8 Section 80(1) of the Labour Act 2003 (Ghana) provides that “Two or more workers employed in the same undertaking may 
form a trade union.” 
9  ILO: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, Geneva: International Labour Office 
(1985), para 255. 
10  ILO: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, Geneva, International Labour Office 
(2006), para 320.  
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unification which deprives the workers of the free exercise of their right of 
association and thus runs counter to the principles which are embedded in 
the international labour Conventions relating to freedom of association.”
1
 
The high threshold of 50 members for the formation of a trade union is clearly inconsistent with 
international law. What is more, given the fact that over 80 per cent of enterprises employ less than 50 persons in 
Nigeria, this provision of the Act is tantamount to industrial disenfranchisement. It is therefore suggested that 
Nigerian law should be amended to stipulate for a minimum of say two persons for the formation of a trade 
union. Indeed, the ILO has raised its concern over Nigerian law requirement that 50 workers form a trade union 
and has reiterated that this number is too high. In a recent report in which it asked to be kept informed of 
developments, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR) has requested Nigeria to take the necessary measures to reduce the minimum membership requirement, 
and thus ensure the right of workers to form organisations of their own choosing.
2
 
 
4.  THE PROMOTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The second significant issue deals with trade union recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining. Trade 
union recognition is germane to the very existence of workers’ organisations. Freedom of association would be 
hollow and of no relevance to workers if employers were entitled to refuse to recognise their organisations for 
purposes of collective bargaining. Trade unions will be hamstrung to protect their members’ interests without 
due recognition. Thus, union recognition is a sine qua non to collective bargaining. 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has ruled that recognition by an employer of the main 
unions represented in his undertaking, or the most representative of these unions, is the very basis for any 
procedure for collective bargaining on conditions of employment in the undertaking.
3
 Where there is no union 
organisation in an industry, the representatives of the unorganised workers duly elected and authorised by the 
workers will conduct bargaining on their behalf.
4
 
Under Nigerian Labour Law, as in the labour laws of other jurisdictions,
5
 the most important step in the 
collective bargaining procedure is for the employer or the employers’ association recognise the trade union as a 
bargaining agent for the employees within the bargaining unit, in relation to terms and conditions of 
employment.
6
 This is a matter of statutory obligation for employers, provided that a trade union has more than 
one of its members in the employment of an employer.
7
 
However, by virtue of section 5 of the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, all registered trade unions 
shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will represent them in negotiations with the employer 
in collective bargaining. By the same token, for the purposes of representation in tripartite bodies, all the 
registered federation of trade unions shall constitute an electoral college taking into account the size of each 
registered federation of trade unions. 
This amendment raises a number of concerns. First, the amendment does not prescribe the modalities 
for constituting an electoral college. This lacuna will have the tendency to encourage favouritism as employers 
will try to influence the criteria for the assessment of representatives who would be disposed to management 
during negotiations. This is likely to generate more industrial strife. Secondly, the law does not prescribe the 
procedure to resolve likely disputes on which union should represent workers in collect bargaining. 
In our view, it would have been better for the law to have clearly adopted either the “majoritarian 
principle” or the principle of the “sufficiently representative union” to avoid possible problems and enhance 
freedom of association in the work place. The majoritarian principle means that because a trade union enjoys a 
majority of members in a particular bargaining unit, it automatically assumes the right to bargain on behalf of all 
those workers who fall within that bargaining unit to the exclusion of all other trade unions. However, all 
benefits accruing from the negotiations with management are enjoyed by all workers in the unit. This is an 
accepted practice in international law and is endorsed by the ILO Freedom of Association Committee when it 
noted thus: 
“...the mere fact that the law of a country draws a distinction 
                                                           
1  Ibid, para.319. 
2  ILO, CEAR, 2007, 96th Session: Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87) Nigeria. 
3   Ibid, para. 618. 
4  Ibid, paras. 785 and 786. 
5  See, for example, Section 50(1) of the Trade Unions and Employers’ Organisations Act, 1992 of  Botswana. 
6  Section 24 of the Trade Unions Act provides that “Where there is a trade union of which persons in the employment of an 
employer are members, that trade union shall, without further assurance, on registration in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act, be entitled to recognition by the employer.” 
7  See Stadium Hotel v National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers (1978/79) NICLR 18; Nigeria Sugar 
Company Limited v National Union of Food, Beverages and Tobacco Employees (1978/79) NICLR 12-13. 
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between the most representative trade union organisations and other 
trade union organisations is not in itself a matter for criticism.”
1
 
On the other hand, the principle of “sufficiently representative trade union” could also be adopted. The 
difference between the two is that, a majority trade union can be the only union in a unit, while in the case of 
sufficiently representative union there can be several of such unions in one unit. 
The principle of representativity ensures that employers do not find themselves in a position where they 
are expected to include in negotiations every single trade union which has members, no matter how insignificant 
the membership. Only those trade unions which could, to a meaningful extent, influence relationships between 
the employer and the body of employees within an agreed bargaining unit are to be allowed at the negotiation 
table. This means that an employer can refuse to negotiate with very small unions and will not be accountable for 
any violation or infringement to the members’ right to collective bargaining; after all, no right is absolute. 
Smaller trade unions must, however, retain their right to exist and to call for new elections for the determination 
of new bargaining agents after the expiration of a reasonable period.
2
 
It has been argued that granting the right of representation in collective bargaining and agreements only 
to the “most representative” union involves the unequal treatment of trade unions since unions that are not “most 
representative” are placed a distinct disadvantage and discriminated against unfairly.
3
 Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that union representation would be more productive if one union is allowed to represent and speak for 
a particular group of workers, It will be counter- productive to grant bargaining status to every trade union that 
demands bargaining rights. This will create serious problem if the numerous union decided to invoke the 
bargaining right simultaneously. For example, confusion and conflict could arise if rival teachers’ unions holding 
quite different views as to proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures, 
each sought to obtain the employers agreement. Without doubt, an excessive number of rival unions at the 
workplace would render worker representation ineffective. 
The problems associated with bargaining with each and every worker or trade union in one bargaining 
unit are well known. Bargaining with too many trade unions in one bargaining unit leads to undercutting of 
wages, disparities in salaries and conditions of service for workers. Secondly, it gives room to employers to 
involve themselves in the internal affairs of unions by trying to manipulate their sweet heart unions so as to 
undermine the stronger unions. In addition, bargaining with too many unions is time-consuming and also very 
costly to the employer. 
More importantly, the lacuna created by the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005 raises the question of 
how exactly the issue of representativity should be determined. It is suggested that Nigeria should adopt either of 
the two principles discussed above, to give workers a clear focus on establishing a collective bargaining body for 
the protection of their interests. Whichever principle is adopted, it is imperative to have a definitive method of 
choosing representatives and an independent or neutral body to carry it out. The ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association has opined that the determination of such representation should be based on “objective and pre-
established criteria” so as to avoid opportunity for partiality or abuse.
4
 The Committee further suggests that 
where the law was involved in the certification of procedure for exclusive bargaining agent, such certification 
was to be made by an independent body.
5
 
A further reform of the labour law in Nigeria must therefore provide an objective and pre-established 
criteria for determining representativity. Such criteria will have to take into account a number of factors such as 
the size of the union, experience and contributions to workers’ welfare. In France, for example, the criteria for 
determining which organisations shall be classified as “most representative” include a number of these factors.
6
 
However, in seeking to choose a “most representative” trade union, the issue of large membership, contributions 
                                                           
1  ILO: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee Geneva, International  Labour Office 
(1985), para 236. It is of course not in the best interest of workers to grant every trade organization bargaining rights. Some 
kind of balance is needed in industrial relations; hence a majority trade union is preferred. 
2   ILO: Committee on Freedom of Association 109th Report, para.100, in Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, 
69th Session, (1987), p.97, See also g. von Potobsky, “Protection of Trade Union Rights: Twenty Years’ Work by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association,” 105 International Labour Review (1972), pp.73-98. 
3 See, for example, the argument of the applicant union in the National Union of Belgian Police Case, Judgement of 27 
October 1975, Series A, Vol. 19 (1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 578. See also Swedish Drivers Union case, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgement of 6 
Feb. 1976, Series A, Vol.20 (1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 617, and Schmidt and Dahlstrom case (1980) 1 E.H.R.R.  637; M. Forde, “The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Labour Law,” 31 American Journal of Comparative Law (1983), pp.301-329. 
4  Committee on Freedom of Association, 109th Report, para 100, in Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, 69th 
Session, 1987, p.97. 
5  Ibid. 
6 Article L. 133-2 of the Labour Code provides that the representativeness of trade unions shall be determined in accordance 
with the following criteria: membership, independence, contributions, the union’s experience, age, and its patriotic stance 
during the (Nazi) occupation. See generally, M. Forde, “Trade Union Pluralism and Labour Law in France,” 33 International 
and Comparative Law Qarterly (1984) pp.135-157. 
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and experience can be seen in the light of how much support a union has among the workforce in question. Large 
membership is an important but not necessarily a deciding factor for this purpose. As the Permanent Court of 
International Justice noted: 
“The most representative organisations... are, of course, those 
organisations which best represent...the workers... Numbers are not 
the only test of the representative character..., but they are an 
important factor; other things being equal, the most numerous will 
be the most representative.
1
 
Undoubtedly, Nigerian labour law does not meet the requirements of international practice on trade 
union representation for effective collective bargaining purposes and needs to be amended to conform to 
international standards. 
 
5.  THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
The third important issue considered here is the right to strike. The right to strike has been described as “an 
indispensable component of a democratic society and a fundamental human right.”
2
 The right to strike is clearly 
a crucial weapon in the armoury of organised labour. The strike is an essential tool of trade union all over the 
world for the defence and promotion of the rights and interests
3
 of their members, and is a necessary counter-
vailing force to the power of capital. In the often-quoted words of Kahn-Freund “there can be no equilibrium in 
industrial relations without a right to strike.”
4
 The need for equilibrium is crucial in order to promote collective 
bargaining which helps to achieve social justice in the work place. The strike plays the same role in labour 
negotiations that warfare plays in diplomatic negotiations
5
. Strike facilitates agreement because the 
consequences of failure are serious, unpleasant, and costly.
6
 1t was in apparent recognition of this fact that Lord 
Wright in his famous dictum in 1942 observed: 
“Where the rights of labour are concerned, the rights of the employers are 
conditioned by the rights of the men to give or withhold their services. The 
right of workmen to strike is an essential element in the principle of 
collective bargaining. It is, in other words, an essential element not only of 
the union’s bargaining process itself; it is also a necessary sanction for 
enforcing agreed rules.”
7
 
The right to strike is thus important to the functioning of a democratic society that its removal would be 
unjustified. 
 Although the right to strike is not explicitly contained in any of the ILO conventions, it arises by 
necessary implication from two ILO Conventions; the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention No.87 1948 and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention No.98 1949. 
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR)
8
 has 
interpreted these two conventions broadly, stating that the right to strike is an intrinsic corollary of the rights 
contained in the two ILO conventions.
9
 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has described the 
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obligation to protect the right to strike as an essential requirement of the Freedom of Association Convention.
1
 
Both the CEACR and the CFA (ILO Supervisory Committees) have consistently reaffirmed the right to strike.
2
 
 The right to strike is not expressly provided for in the Nigerian Constitution or in labour legislation in 
Nigeria. It is recognised and protected in labour legislation on the basis of assumed conflicting interests between 
employers and employees, who are the two parties to labour relations. The absence of constitutional recognition 
could mean that the Constitution has failed to protect the right to strike. However, the Constitution guarantees 
the right to freedom of association and, given that international treaties to which Nigeria is a signatory recognise 
the right to strike as a species of the right to freedom of association, this would appear to give constitutional 
status to the right to strike. As noted above, the ILO jurisprudence shows that the right to strike is a key part of 
the freedom of association.
3
 
There is therefore a clear support or a freedom of association which protects industrial action. Indeed, at 
the collective level of industrial relations it is hard to envisage freedom of association without the right to strike.
4
 
However, some decisions outside Nigeria have taken a different approach to freedom of association and the right 
to strike. The leading example is the case of Collymore v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago
5
 where the 
Privy Council held, in 1970, that there was no necessary link between freedom of association and the right to 
strike. The court said: 
“It...seems to their Lordships inaccurate to contend that the abridgement of 
the right to free collective bargaining and of the freedom to strike leaves the 
assurance of ‘freedom of association’ empty of worthwhile content.”
6
 
Similarly, in the case of Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden
7
 the European Court of Human Rights held 
that while Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) specifically 
mentions the rights to join trade unions as a species of the broader right of association, this does not ipso facto 
include the right to strike. The court said: 
“The Article does not secure any particular treatment of trade union 
members by the State....(It) leaves each State a free choice of the means to be 
used towards this end. The grant of a right to strike represents without  any 
doubt one of the most important of these means, but there are others. Such a 
right, which is not expressly enshrined in Article II, may be subject under 
national law to regulation of a kind that limits its exercise in certain 
instances.”
8
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It is submitted that, unless freedom of association is interpreted as purposive in nature, it will be 
rendered useless. To accept these decisions would be to deny the purposive role of freedom of association. The 
protection of members’ interests would be difficult for an association which has no sanctions to employ.
1
 
Thus, while it is vital to protect the ability of workers to form, join and maintain unions, unless workers 
are also protected in their pursuance of the objects for which they have associated, such as the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to strike, the freedom is meaningless. As Skelly J has said: 
“Obviously, the right to strike is essential to the viability of a labour union... 
(I)f the inherent purpose of a labour organisation is to bring the workers’ 
interests to bear on management, the right to strike is , historically and 
practically, an important means of effectuating that purpose. A union that 
never strikes, or which can make no credible threat to strike, may wither 
away in effectiveness... and cannot survive the pressures in the present-day 
industrial world.”
2
 
A trade union without the right to strike is a “poor” and “weak” trade union indeed.
3
  
However, Nigerian labour law contains serious legislated attacks on the right to strike which seems to have 
rendered the right nugatory and fictitious.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examined the extent to which Nigerian labour law complies with international labour standards, 
especially the standards set by the ILO. One cannot claim that Nigerian workers enjoy a high degree of 
protection of their democratic rights. As has been seen, there is a widening gap between international labour 
standards and Nigerian labour law. In terms of Nigeria’s international obligations, Nigerian law has maintained, 
and indeed compounded, existing areas of non-compliance.  
Nigerian law has made an improvement in that workers now have the right to belong to a union of their 
choice. There is no longer compulsory trade union membership of any sort. However, the reform is not complete 
because the minimum number for the formation of a trade union is still pegged at 50 members. This makes it 
difficult to realise the dream of belonging or forming a union of one’s choice because more than 80 per cent of 
establishments in Nigeria have less than 50 workers. Consequently, more reform is needed in this area if workers 
are to enjoy freedom of association in the real sense. 
With regards to collective bargaining, the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005 has merely provided a 
basis for trade unions to elect their representatives for purposes of collective bargaining with employers in the 
workplace without any laid down criteria for doing same. Because of obvious reasons of conflict and confusion 
that may result where numerous unions struggle for recognition and bargaining rights with the employer, there 
must he a criteria by which a more mature and representative trade union is selected to protect the interests of all 
workers in the bargaining unit. It has been argued that the law must he reformed to adopt either the “majoritarian 
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principle” or the “principle of sufficiently representative trade union” to strengthen the process of collective 
bargaining and enhance freedom of association. 
The other area where the law fails completely to make any positive impact is the right to strike. The law 
seriously undermines the right to strike. In the first place, by adopting an overly broad list of essential services, 
workers in essential services, which in the case of Nigeria constitute more than half of the entire working 
population, are denied the right to strike. Secondly, the preconditions for a lawful strike including picketing are 
such that it will practically be impossible for strike to take place. The conclusion must that the Nigerian worker 
has been denied the right to strike. This tilts the bargaining power more and more in favour of the employers. In 
a free market economy every one is only able to achieve economic progress by a clever manipulation of the 
forces of the market. To deprive the worker of his right to organise industrial action is not only to deprive him of 
a requisite weapon in his bargaining armoury, but an attempt to leave him economically rudderless and 
unprotected in the fierce economic encounters with the employer. There is therefore a need to amend the law to 
guarantee the right to strike in line with international standards to enhance workers’ freedom of association. As 
Kahn-Freund once noted: 
“No country I know of suppresses the freedom to strike in peace time except 
dictatorships and countries practicing racial discrimination… a legal system 
which suppresses the freedom to strike puts the workers at the mercy of the 
employers.”
1
 
To be fair, Nigeria cannot he described as a dictatorship and she is not known for a policy of racial 
discrimination. To take away the right to strike therefore is to make workers and their trade union lame ducks or 
guinea pigs in a shooting range. 
One measure of the health of any society is the extent to which its legal system and administration are 
in time with contemporary realities and contemporary public opinion.
2
 It is submitted that the 2005 Act does not 
meet its expressed aims of, inter alia, complying with ILO requirements concerning democratisation in the 
organisation of labour.
3
 There is therefore a need for more reform in this labour law and industrial relations 
system to make a reality out of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association. Freedom of association as 
a human right is indivisible. This means that it cannot be guaranteed to one section of the society, while workers 
are lagging behind. Indeed, the adverse criticisms and damning conclusions of the ILO supervisory bodies - the 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR) raises significant concerns-which undoubtedly strengthen the case for 
changing Nigerian labour law. 
Labour standards have become the subject of international rules through bodies such as the ILO. Such 
standards are an increasing part of the global economy of which Nigeria is a part. One must hope that Nigeria 
will unleash its workers and translate these standards into Nigerian labour law and industrial relations system in 
order to fully secure workers rights. In fact, given Nigeria’s prominent membership of the African Union and its 
important role and status as a member of the Governing Body of the ILO, it must be expected to show a very 
positive example in all spheres of respect for global labour standards. 
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